Introduction
Last year I received a Reassigned Time Award to write a book chapter on virtue and vice with respect to anger. The award was incredibly helpful and fruitful; my chapter is part of a forthcoming volume from Oxford University Press on philosophical accounts of individual virtues. I was also able to use some of my research to develop and offer a new course: Philosophy and Psychology of Emotion. This year I propose to use NMU's Reassigned Time Award to complete a book chapter on what I term "The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions." Many philosophers working on moral responsibility (Bennett 1980; Watson 1993; Wallace 1994; Fischer and Ravizza 1998;  McKenna 1998) follow P.F. Strawson in thinking that we should understand claims about someone's moral responsibility in terms of the appropriateness of the blaming emotions:
anger, resentment, and indignation (Strawson 1982) . But even those who would not follow Strawson in identifying moral responsibility attributions with the appropriateness of emotions hold that emotions play an important role in our moral responsibility practice (Scanlon 2008) . In spite of this, the significance of blaming emotions for our moral responsibility practices has been philosophically under-theorized.
In my recent research and writing on virtue and vices of anger, I argue that anger has three functions in human psychology. Anger functions as an appraisal of wrongdoing, as a motivation to action, and as a communicative device. But this can be extended from anger to all three blaming emotions. First, the blaming emotions appraise the actions of a person as wrongful. Much of the psychological research on appraisal and emotion holds that appraisal causes emotions. But holding that the blaming emotions are caused by an appraisal of a person's action mistakes the relationship between the two. There is not clear scientific evidence that all episodes of the blaming emotions are caused by a relevant appraisal, and not all psychologists agree that appraisals always precede emotions or are necessary for it (Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004a; Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004b; Parkinson 1999) . We better understand the relationship between the blaming emotions and appraisal (and emotion and appraisal, more generally) if we hold that the blaming emotions are not caused by the appraisal that an act is wrong; rather, the blaming emotions are appraisals of actions as wrong (Parkinson 1997) . Thus, the blaming emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate depending on whether or not their appraisal is accurate.
The blaming emotions also motivate actions. For example, the blaming emotions are a common and powerful cause of aggression (Baumeister and Bushman 2007, 66) , though they are neither necessary nor sufficient for it (Averill 1982; Tavris 1989) . In general, the blaming emotions energize people, motivate them to approach the target of the blaming emotion (E. Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones 2007, 103-105), and lead people to try to change their situation (Baumeister and Bushman 2007, 67) . Thus, the blaming emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate depending on the actions they are likely to motivate.
Finally, the blaming emotions are not just appraisals of a situation that generate characteristic motivations; they also involve communicative acts or responses. For example, one of the most striking things about the blaming emotions and anger, in particular, is that they are associated with communicative facial expressions (Ekman 1999). These communications are then observed, responded to, or ignored by other people, thus providing another opportunity for emotional engagement. People feeling the blaming emotions communicate that the target of their anger has acted wrongfully and urge others to share their anger at the target, thereby, implicitly at least, sharing their appraisal of the target. Thus, the blaming emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate depending on whether it is appropriate to communicate their appraisal and to urge others to share the motivations of the person feeling the blaming emotion. Now I am interested in extending these claims to the idea that the blaming emotions are tightly connected to our moral responsibility practices thus breaking through an impasse in the moral responsibility literature. It is common for a philosopher defending one view of moral responsibility to critique that of another as philosophically myopic. To take just one example, some philosophers hold that people are morally responsible when blaming or praising them produces good consequences (Mill 1979; Dennett 1984) . That view has recently been criticized as unacceptably shallow (Smilansky 2001) because it ignores the appraisal dimension of moral responsibility attribution. In response, I argue that this view characterizes important parts of our moral responsibility practices in virtue of the motivation function of the blaming emotions. Our motivational reserves are not limitless; we have to decide where and when to direct our energies. Thus an important constraint on when it makes sense to feel the blaming emotions toward someone is whether it would produce good consequences.
We therefore make more progress in understanding moral responsibility if we accept that we have several interests in play in holding people morally responsible and that these interests roughly conform to the psychological functions of the blaming emotions. No extant theory of moral responsibility takes all three functions into account.
I argue that to do justice to our moral responsibility practices our theory must take all three into account. My aim in the proposed work is to defend this new theory of moral responsibility and show why it is a better candidate for capturing our moral responsibility practices than any other extant view.
Not only do I hope to provide a corrective to simplistic thinking about moral responsibility, but I also hope to use the account of moral responsibility that emerges from a psychological examination of the blaming emotions to address some puzzling issues. For example, my framework can help us understand the moral responsibility of psychopaths and people who are morally insane, and I believe my analysis can be extended to address the ambivalence we feel about holding responsible wrongdoers who have been subject to unfair formative circumstances, as well as the reasons for and against holding drug abusers morally responsible.
This project on the three-fold significance of the blaming emotions will result in an 8,000 to 10,000-word chapter to be included in a forthcoming volume of Oxford 
Further Directions
While I continue to revise and revisit my thinking about vice and virtue with respect to anger, my philosophical and psychological research on anger and other emotions leads in several promising directions. Here I highlight just one. I am particularly interested in exploring the connection between emotions like anger and certain moral concepts, like moral responsibility. My view is that we can understand more about moral responsibility and thereby have a greater appreciation of the conditions under which it is appropriate to hold people morally responsible if we have a greater understanding of emotions, like anger, that I believe help to shape our concept of moral responsibility. If anger has several different psychological functions, that should mean that moral responsibility is a concept with several functions as well. I hope to explore the implications of this thesis in future work.
